


NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FINAL REPORT ON THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS JANUARY 25, 2006

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SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

Despite the difficult circumstance of the ongoing conflict and occupation, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians went to the polls on January 25, 2006 to elect the new members of the PLC. Voting occurred in a largely festive and peaceful environment. The delegation was deeply moved by this clear demonstration of Palestinian enthusiasm to participate in democratic elections. The CEC and electoral staff operated confidently, effectively and impartially, resulting in a process that compared favorably to international standards.

International standards for legitimate elections mandate a sound legal framework and an impartial and effective election administration that conducts its activities in an open manner.

More detailed regulations with enforceable sanctions should be introduced to address issues of campaign finance and campaign activities, especially concerning the use of public resources in campaigns. The prohibition of election day campaigning should be

POLITICAL CONTEXT

Since it was first established in 1996, the PLC has struggled to carve out a role for itself that is independent from and serves as an effective check on the executive branch. These efforts have yielded mixed results. While it appears to have been sidelined in the past, the PLC has undertaken some recent initiatives that have demonstrated its growing capacity to call the

FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

regulations that are no longer in force. In addition, registration is largely a formality and does not require entities to abide by established democratic principles. As a result, there are still no appropriate regulations concerning political party registration and activities, an urgent need that must be addressed. A number of other important aspects of the electoral process – such as voting for the security forces and certain details regarding voter registration (exhibition and challenges to the register, for instance) – are not provided for in the law and are simply regulated by CEC instructions or bylaws rather than the Elections Law or other laws. For instance, voting arrangements for the security forces register are currently covered in a bylaw awaiting approval from the cabinet.

The CEC is charged with administering presidential and parliamentary elections in the West

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Hamas' participation in the 2006 elections presented a unique challenge as the group advocates violence, including the killing of civilians, as a means to achieving a political end. It is also committed to the destruction of a United Nations member state. While it is in the long term

with another recommendation from international observer groups including NDI, the CEC recently introduced continuous voter registration, a step that will make it even easier for eligible Palestinians to register. On election day, there were no reports of significant problems with the voters' register, a further testament to the credibility of the new list. Voter registration was temporarily suspended in East Jerusalem when Israel shut down seven registration centers. Centers for East Jerusalem residents to register for the PLC elections were eventually set up outside of the city.

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Palestinians registered to vote, who permanently reside in the West Bank or Gaza and are at least 28 years of age on election day are eligible to run for legislative seats. In order to participate in elections as partisan entities, political movements must first be registered with the Ministry of Interior and subsequently secure accreditation from the CEC prior to candidate registration. There are currently 14 registered partisan entities including Fateh and Hamas. Procedures for candidate registration are relatively simple and include the submission of an electoral platform, a list of signatures belonging to 3,000 eligible voters, basic information about each candidate and a deposit of \$US 6,000 for each national list. No signatures or deposits are required for district-based seats.

District election officials were prepared to handle the large number of candidate applications. Registration papers were processed without any significant delays or complaints by the contesting parties and most candidates viewed the registration procedures as fair. However,

A total of 728 candidates competed in the PLC elections: 414 for district-based seats and 314 on the 11 national proportional representation lists.

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Article 100 of the Elections Law No 9 of 2005 prohibits candidates and electoral lists from receiving campaign funding from foreign sources. The spending limits for national lists and district-based seats are \$US 1 million and \$US 60,000 respectively. All lists and successful candidates are required to submit detailed financial statements to the CEC within one month of the announcement of the final election results. These statements are expected to indicate all sources of funding and campaign expenses.

During the presidential elections, the CEC criticized some PA officials for campaigning and one of the candidates was charged by his rivals of using foreign funding. In the aftermath of the Presidential election, all but one of the candidates complied with the requests for financial records although two of the reports missed the deadline for submission. The reports largely took the form of general statements on expenditures and income. They did not include itemized lists of funding sources, specific information on how money was spent, or which vendors or individuals received payments from the campaign.

THE CAMPAIGN

These elections provided Palestinians with their first opportunity in 10 years to hold their legislators accountable. According to public opinion polls, the main issues of concern to voters 54.s from plied cor77Res comompaign.

The delegation heard reports of attempts to interfere with the individual choices of members of the security forces. There is also evidence that security forces received written instructions to cast their vote for particular candidates. The marked and unexpectedly high number of security force voters on the first day of voting in particular, led many to conclude that they had been pressured to claim illiteracy so that agents who "coached" them while voting were permitted to accompany them throughout the process. In response to these concerns, the CEC temporarily suspended application of the provisions for assisted voting. While illegal, this decisive step, combined with high-level consultations with high-ranking officials in the security forces, proved effective in limiting further abuses. The ban on assisted voting was lifted as soon as the problem

In general, security forces maintained a visible but appropriate presence outside polling stations and did not interfere with the process. Israeli authorities generally opened checkpoints on election day and otherwise facilitated freedom of movement for voters, election workers and observers.

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Under Palestinian law, election campaigns must end 24 hours before election day. As with past elections, campaigning by virtually all contestants was widespread on election day. This ranged from the distribution of mock ballots by campaign workers outside almost every single polling center visited by observers to the use of loudspeakers placed immediately outside polling centers to broadcast campaign slogans and the names of candidates. A truck full of activists shouting campaign slogans drove through Nablus. In addition, get-out-the-vote efforts in neighborhoods

instances, election day osphere. However, in scattered incidents of

ensively abused in the at the provisions have ence over individuals' , each person is only e wishes of the voter. both to ensure that the consistently followed. past elections though Voting at Israeli post offices has been fraught with problems. The postal facilities tend to be small, making it difficult to accommodate more than a few voters at any one time. In addition, during the 2005 presidential election, many eligible Palestinians arrived at post offices only to find that their names were not on the lists for the post offices closest to their homes. In one case, two sisters who lived at the same address, and who had registered to vote at the same center in East Jerusalem found their names on the lists of two different polling stations several kilometers apart. These voters were referred to the special centers outside the city boundaries. Eventually, a solution weral kil12 -472ity boundaries. Eventually, eral undari

As with past elections, women played a large and visible role in the process as election officials, party/candidate agents, nonpartisan observers and voters. For instance, many of the party/candidate representatives who were placed outside polling centers to ensure that all sympathizers were coming to vote were women. In some cases, women filled all the election staff positions in particular polling stations.

ELECTORAL DISPUTES

Electoral disputes are received and ruled upon by an Elections Appeals Court whose nine members are appointed by presidential decree upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court. Fateh submitted petitions challenging the election results for Salfit, Nablus, Gaza, Khan Younis and Jerusalem and requested a rerun in those districts. The petitions concerning Nablus and Salfit Districts were eventually withdrawn by Fateh. In the Gaza Strip and Khan Younis petitions, Fateh representatives argued that voters received coaching and that the ballots were not properly counted. A separate petition submitted by Hamas argued that a data entry error by the CEC cost the movement one seat under the proportional representation system. The Fateh petitions were rejected because they were not submitted after the deadline for electoral complaints. In the Hamas case, the CEC was ordered to verify its data entry. When no errors were found, the petition was rejected. Both plaintiffs have accepted the court's ruling.

OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTIONS

Palestinian electoral law guarantees candidate representatives access to all aspects of the electoral process. Large numbers of party/candidate agents as well as nonpartisan Palestinian observers from such groups as Arab Thought Forum, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the Palestinian Election Monitoring Committee and Filistinayat monitored the elections. They worked collaboratively with each other and election officials to enhance prospects for a legitimate process. Although few of them carried out their duties with the assistance of written materials, their strong presence during pre-election events and on election day demonstrated the growing capacity of Palestinians to safeguard the integrity of their election processes.

In addition, hundreds of international observers representing more than 40 organizations and diplomatic missions received accreditation to monitor the process. The largest of these international observation missions were the European Union, the European Parliament, the Canadian and NDI-Carter Center delegation. There was a very high degree of coordination among the international observers, particularly the largest missions, which is consistent with the growing cooperation among organizations that endorse the Declaration of Principles for International Election ObservationBoth Israeli and Palestinian officials were extremely helpful in accommodating the work of the delegation.

Prior to election day, the CEC issued instructions to all polling staff asking them to make all data, protocols and statistics available to observers. While commendable, these instructions were

FINAL RESULTS

The official results published by the CEC awarded Hamas and Fateh 74 and 45 seats respectively. In addition, seats were secured by Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa (3), Third Way (2), Alternative (2), Independent Palestine (2) and various independent candidates (4).

It is the delegation's judgment that the shortcomings in the electoral process had no material impact on the outcome of the elections. Consequently, the published results are believed to

before the next elections, at a minimum, steps should be taken to protect the right to a secret ballot.

Low turnout among East Jerusalemites is often attributed to the fear of the loss of certain benefits. Although no evidence of such losses has been presented to NDI or The Carter Center, the perception of a potential for discrimination is as damaging to public confidence as proven cases of discrimination. In such contexts, extraordinary measures are required to reestablish faith in the ability of public officials to treat people equally. Therefore, the Institute reiterates previous calls upon Israeli officials to issue public assurances that there will be no retribution against Palestinian Jerusalemites for voting. Such efforts could help allay Palestinian fears.

Despite being appointed by Presidential Decree, the current CEC was able to withstand efforts to politically interfere with its administration of the process. There are few safeguards to help ensure that future commissions will be able to discharge their duties to the same degree of impartiality. To isolate future commissions from any actual or perceived political biases, the PLC should revisit the procedures by which CEC members are appointed. The procedures should provide for broad input on potential CEC members and incorporate adequate checks and balances in the process. On balance, the appointment system must guarantee the impartiality and competence of the individual members and a body that warrants public confidence in its independence and effectiveness. In accordance with general practice elsewhere, once appointed, Commissioners should be allowed to elect their own chair from among their members. The procedures for the recruitment of the Chief Electoral Officer and the necessary qualifications should also be regulated by law.

To address the few cases in which CEC instructions were not respected, the Commission should redouble its efforts to ensure that all electoral staff grant observers full access to all data, protocols and other polling station information provided that the observers do not disrupt the process.

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Widespread violation of the prohibition on election day campaigning by parties on all sides, while appearing to have no material impact on the outcome of the election, makes a mockery of the law. To promote respect for the rules of engagement and to prevent inappropriate election day campaigning in the future, legal campaign periods and restrictions should be properly enforced or reviewed to better reflect Palestinian culture in a way that is consistent with

use of mosques for campaigning violates Palestinian law and the Political Party Code of Conduct.

No democracy has been spared the scourge of political scandals arising from unethical or illegal political financing practices and campaign activities, a problem that undermines one of democracy's greatest assets – the faith of ordinary citizens in the political process. The experience of other democracies suggests that a combination of comprehensive regulation, effective and impartial enforcement of the rules and active monitoring by civil society and the media can help limit inappropriate behavior. Campaign finance laws are most effective when supplemented by additional regulations that limit the discretion of public officials and thus, opportunities for influence peddling and other abuses. Palestinian authorities should work to refine regulations concerning campaign activities and finance and improve their enforcement. The Institute also encourages civil society and the media to continue exposing abuses and to contribute to the debate about ways to limit illegitimate practices.

In a commendable move, the CEC recently wrote to contestants in the PLC elections reminding them to submit their campaign finance reports within the legally mandated period – one month from the announcement of the final election results. The Commission has also announced that it is considering referring the reports to a financial and administrative monitoring committee that would help ensure that the documents filed by contestants meet the legal requirements.

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The current timelines mandated in Palestinian laws handle voter registration as a single event. They should be updated to bring them in line with the recently-introduced continuous voter registration. In addition, a number of important aspects of the electoral process are defined in bylaws -- instructions drawn up by the CEC, and approved by the President, but should be regulated in law. For instance, procedures for displaying and challenging the voters' register and arrangements for voting by the security forces should be enshrined in the law.

The distribution of mandates posed no particular problem for this election. However, leaving this potentially sensitive task to the discretion of the President could raise concerns in future elections. This provision of the Election Law should be revisited with a view to introducing more detailed procedures that ensure a transparent and impartial manner of distributing mandates across the West Bank and Gaza that incorporates checks and balances.

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In environments where movement and communication between different locations are problematic, the integrity of electoral processes can easily be compromised. NDI recognizes that there are legitimate security concerns relating to certain individuals and groups. Without minimizing those concerns, it is important to find ways to establish acceptable conditions for a legitimate election. Elections administration officials, contestants and their representatives and voters must all be allowed unfettered access to all parts of the West Bank and Gaza so that they can conduct legitimate activities during all aspects of the entire electoral process.

APPENDIX A:

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE NDI / CARTER CENTER INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION TO THE PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS Jerusalem, January 26, 2006

This preliminary statement on the January 25, 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections is offered by the international observer delegation organized by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with The Carter Center. The delegation was led by former United States President Jimmy Carter, former Albanian President Rexhep Meidani, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and former Spanish Foreign Minister Ana Palacio. It included current and former legislators, former ambassadors, elections and human rights experts, civic leaders and regional specialists from 22 countries in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and North America. The delegation visited the Palestinian territories from January 21-26 and deployed 85 observers to the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

This delegation is part of NDI's two-year comprehensive observation of Palestinian election processes, which is supported by USAID and which began with the 2004 voter registration process and included all five rounds of the 2004-2005 municipal elections, the joint NDI/Carter Center

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS

Under the difficult circumstances of the ongoing conflict and occupation, Palestinian voters turned out in large numbers in a strong expression of their desire to choose representatives through open and competitive elections. The obvious pride and enthusiasm of Palestinians about the election process was evident throughout the voting districts. This was reinforced by the professional and impartial performance of election officials. Through the high turnout in these elections and in the 2005 presidential election, as well as the notable participation in five rounds of municipal elections. It is now up to the elected leaders and representatives to construct genuinely democratic institutions and processes that will bring the peace and prosperity that the Palestinian people deserve, within a free and independent state.

The January 25 elections can be an important step on the road to greater democracy for the Palestinian people. They present a unique challenge in that they included a group that advocated the use of violence as a means of achieving a political end and refuse to give up arms. Also, it has been committed to the destruction of a United Nations member state. It is universally accepted that democratic elections and democratic governance are about employing peaceful means to achieve political goals. We hope that the elections will mark a decisive move toward the renunciation of violence by all groups and toward addressing corruption and other issues that are central to improving the lives of Palestinians.

The elections were characterized by the following positive developments.

- < Within the bounds of an occupied territory, the legal framework for the elections generally compared favorably to international standards.
- < The adoption of a voluntary code of conduct by all political parties set an important precedent, though not all points were consistently implemented.

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The Legal Framework. The legal framework for the PLC elections was provided by the Basic Law and the Election Law. Though incomplete and not without shortcomings, they provide a foundation for democratic elections and compare favorably to international standards. The legal framework provides for 132 seats in the PLC, 66 of which are determined by proportional representation. Eleven parties and independents groups competed for those seats with closed national lists of candidates. The other 66 seats are divided into electoral districts corresponding to the 16 Palestinian governorates, with seats allocated to each district based on population, providing at least one seat per governorate. Voters then selected up to the number of individual candidates on the ballot corresponding to the number of seats allocated to their respective governate. Six seats were set aside for Christians, with the Christian candidates receiving the highest number of votes in designated governates being awarded the allocated seats and the remaining seats in the governate going to the highest vote winners that are not Christian. National party lists for the proportional seats must contain one woman in the first three names on the list, one woman in the next four names and one woman in every five names thereafter, thus approximating 20 percent of each list. There were no requirements for including women as candidates for the district-based majoritarian seats.

Electoral Administration. The CEC and its staff operated with a high level of confidence among the political contestants and the Palestinian population. Despite uncertainties in the timing of the elections, the difficult circums

Code of Conduct.A voluntary code of conduct, developed by the Arab Thought Forum with support from NDI, was signed by all political parties. Compliance with the code's provisions concerning peaceful and fair campaigning was monitored by nonpartisan Palestinian observers, including the Higher National Committee to Follow up The Code of Conduct. The process leading to acceptance of the code and its monitoring may have contributed to the relative peacefulness of the campaign.

Improper Campaign ActivitySignificant issues were noted by international and Palestinian nonpartisan election observers concerning use of Palestinian Authority resources for the benefit of Fateh and campaigning in a significant number of mosques for Hamas candidates. Public resources, including government funds, vehicles, communications equipment, materials and work hours of government officials and employees belong to the Palestinian people and should not be used for the benefit of individual parties or candidates. The lack of a clear and enforceable regulatory framework for campaign activities and financing undermines public trust. At the same time, use of religious facilities to benefit individual parties and candidates runs counter to standards for democratic elections and is counter to Palestinian law and the political party code of conduct.

Freedom of Movement and Campaigninghere were numerous confirmed reports that political candidates and campaign workers, as well as in some cases election workers, were unable to move satisfactorily through checkpoints during the campaign period that began officially on January 3. On the first day of the official campaign, candidates in the Jerusalem district were prevented from campaigning near the gates of the old city. Israeli police detained some candidates and dispersed the crowd.

Security Situation in GazaIncidents of violence and disorder in the Gaza Strip during the campaign period, especially those near the Rafah border crossing, had distinct political overtones. In addition, the CEC offices were raided and closed by gunmen, and one party's campaign worker was shot and killed by a rival activist. There was at least one politically motivated threat that mentioned international observers, though all factions announced publicly that they disavowed any such threats. Police forces in Gaza appealed to the Palestinian political leadership for more support, refusing in some cases to intervene to stop violent incidents on the streets, due to lack of resources to impose law and order. These conditions added to the problems of organizing successful elections.

The Media. The Palestinian mass media present a plurality of views. Palestinians also have ready access to regional and international new media, which provided significant coverage of the elections. Parties and candidates, by law, were provided free access to public broadcast media to offer messages to the electorate. The media carried paid political advertisements, and political posters were present throughout the Palestinian territories.

The political contestants therefore were able to present their views to the population, and voters received information upon which to make informed political choices in the elections. However, professional international and Palestinian media monitors, including monitoring by the Pavia Institute for the European Union Election Observation Mission and the Palestinian NGO "Filastiniyat", noted significant bias in the broadcast media, with the public media favoring Fateh and privately owned media favoring candidates who owned certain media outlets. Media monitors also noted that some media outlets discriminated by charging candidates different prices for political advertisements. The lack of regulations to ensure fairness and prevent discrimination remain a weakness in the electoral framework.

ELECTION DAY

Election day was orderly, well administered and generally peaceful. This was a particularly significant accomplishment in light of the ongoing conflict and occupation, as well as the tensions and incidents in the Gaza Strip during the lead-up to the elections. There were, however, limited instances of disturbances and violence in Gaza and Hebron governate (Beit Awwa and Ash Shuyuk).

Palestinian voters turned out in large numbers in a clear expression of their desire to choose their representatives in open and competitive elections. Through the high turnout in these and the 2005 presidential election, and notable participation in five rounds of municipal elections over the last year, Palestinians have demonstrated a strong

The delegation held meetings with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas; the Chairman and officials of the Central Election Commission (CEC); representatives of the major competing political parties/candidate lists that have renounced violence; civic leaders; news media; political analysts; the heads of the European Union, European Parliament and Canadian Observation Missions; other representatives of the international community who are concerned with supporting a democratic Palestinian election process; and senior Israeli government officials and analysts. The delegation worked in close cooperation with Palestinian nonpartisan election monitoring organizations and with the European Union's International Observation Mission.

Delegates divided into teams and deployed to 14 electoral districts in the Palestinian Territories for meetings with governmental, electoral, political and civic leaders in their respective localities. On election day, the teams observed the voting, counting and tabulation processes in over 300 polling centers selected on the basis of a scientific statistical sample and at District Election Commissions. Delegates then reconvened in Jerusalem to debrief and develop this statement. The delegation expresses its gratitude to all with whom it met.

APPENDIX B:







STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE/CARTER CENTER PRE

Background

The code is a necessary but incomplete step toward ensuring that elections are about peaceful means to achieve political ends. The Palestinian Authority and newly elected PLC should, as a priority, amend the election and party laws to ensure that political entities participate in elections fairly and peacefully and do not advocate the use of violence as a political tool. This prohibition should apply equally to all groups.

Voting in East Jerusalem

There are an estimated 120,000 eligible voters in East Jerusalem, accounting for as much as 9% of the total Palestinian electorate. Given the long-standing dispute over the status of Jerusalem, these voters have yet to obtain a reasonable opportunity to exercise their franchise.

A compromise was reached in 1995 (the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement Elections Protocol, Annex II, Article VI) that provided some opportunity for Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem to vote. The arrangement, utilized during the first PLC election in January 1996 and again in the Palestinian Presidential election of 2005, utilized Israeli post offices in East Jerusalem as a location for Palestinians to cast ballots. This arrangement allowed Palestinians to cast ballots within the boundaries of Jerusalem but could also be considered a form of "postal ballot" in that ballot boxes were picked up at the end of the voting day and transported to counting centers within the West Bank administered by Palestinian election authorities.

The 1996 and 2005 arrangements for East Jerusalem were far from optimal and caused difficulties and confusion (see <u>www.ndi.org</u> for previous reports) but they did allow elections to go ahead. Israel has, so far, declined to offer even this imperfect arrangement for the PLC election of 2006, but has instead offered to facilitate the travel of the approximately 120,000 eligible Jerusalem voters to voting places situated outside the municipal borders of Jerusalem. The reasoning behind the Israeli stance includes a reluctance to accept that Hamas is participating in the election, and therefore an unwillingness to facilitate voting for Hamas in areas where the Israeli State -- postal posal i S [(Thrd aiead offered to facsum)8ilitatranchise. e 1996he munin the boundaries of Jeded even a

NDI and the Carter Center recommend the following as possible solutions to the impasse:

- 1) While recognizing its shortcomings, the preferred solution would be to reach a political agreement to allow voting with substantially the same arrangements as in 1996 and January 2005. The precedent already exists, the arrangements are familiar to voters, and, with explicit Israeli cooperation, the CEC can accomplish the necessary organizational tasks within the time left before election day. While significant problems with voting may still occur, this procedure would probably be the best available at this juncture.
- 2) A second option, which partially takes into account Israeli reluctance to facilitate voting in East Jerusalem, is to set up polling stations in private locations in East Jerusalem which may include private schools, hotels or clubs. While still requiring some Israeli security arrangements, government-owned facilities would

NDI and the Carter Center evaluated the CEC plan for the voting of security forces. Arrangements have been made that would include 77 special polling stations located in governorate capitals that would be made available for early voting for security forces in their home governorate. Early voting would take place over three days prior to the election and would apply to registered voters only. The delegation considers the CEC's plan as an appropriate application of international standards.

The CEC has been under pressure to allow security forces to vote only within their barracks – a plan that would create many opportunities for fraud and manipulation and

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PLC District Results 2006*

Electoral district : Jerusalem	District No. : 01	No.	of candidates : 39
Total No. of seats : 6	Christian quota : 2		

Electoral district : Tubas District No. : 04 No of candidates : 9 Total No. of seats : 1

Electoral district : Qalqilya	Ele	ctoral district : 06	No. of candidates : 10
Total No. of seats : 2			

No.	Candidate	Political affiliation	Votes
1	WALEED ASSAF	Fateh Movement	14.049
2	AHMAD SHREIM	Fateh Movement	12.900
3	KHADER AS SEDEH	Change and Reform	9.090
4	MOHMMAD NAZAL	Change and Reform	8.372
5	SALMAN SALMAN	Independent	1.580
6	KHALID YAHYA	PFLP	1.114
7	HASEM ALSHAIR	Independent	1.057
8	AHMAD YOUSEF	Independent	805
9	ABED ELFATEH DAWOD	Independent	555
10	BELAL JAPER	Independent	348

Electoral district : Salfit District No. : 07

7 No. of candidates : 11

Electoral district : Ramallah & al- Bireh	District No. : 08 No. of	candidates : 34
Total No. of seats : 5	Christian quota : 1	

No.	Candidate	Political affiliation	Votes	Remarks
1	HASAN DAR KHALEIL	Change and Reform	37.306	
2	FADEL FADEL HAMDAN	Change and Reform	33.594	
3	AHMAD MOBARAK	Change and Reform	33.133	
4	MAHMOUD MUSLEH	Change and Reform	30.825	

Electoral district : Bethlehem District No. : 10	No. of candidates : 32
Total No. of seats : 4 Christian quota : 2	

No. Candidate Political affiliation

Electoral district : Hebron	District No. : 11	No. of candidates : 46
Total No. of seats : 9		

No. Candidate

Electoral district : Gaza	District No. : 13	No. of candidates : 49
Total No. of seats : 8	Christian quota : 1	


No.	Candidate	Political affiliation	Votes	Remarks
1	SAID SEYAM	Change and Reform	75.880	
1	SAID SEYAM	Change and Reform	75.880	

Electoral district : Deir al- Balah Dis	trict No. : 14 No. of can	didates: 18
Total No. of seats : 3		
No. Candidate	Political affiliation	/otes

Electoral district : Khan Younis District No Total No. of seats : 5	lo. : 15 No. of candidates : 43
o. Candidate MOHAMMED DAHLAN IIS EL-ASTAL6 0 0 8:4606 151,2661.2	Political affiliation Votes Fateh Movement 38.349 291 6486 151.26648.753 Re.f086 9202(8)65308.94284 620252207.2937.0433661.522948.7

Electoral district : Rafah District No. : 16 No. of candidates : 12





THE CARTER CENTER



National Democratic Institute/The Carter Center International Observation Mission, Palestinian Legislative Council Elections January 25, 2006

Delegation Leadership Group

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NILS DANIEL CARL BILDT Delegation Co-Leader Former Prime Minister of Sweden

REXHEP M EIDANI Delegation Co-Leader Former President of Albania

ANA PALACIO Delegation Co-Leader Former Foreign Minister of Spain

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Berna

RICHARD GEE Area: Governorate of Gaza United Kingdom

JULIA JUERGENS Area: Governorates of Ramallah and Salfeet Germany

EVELINA KRINICKAITE Area: Governorates of Hebron and Bethlehem Lithuania

OLEKSIY LYCHKOVAKH Area: Governorate of Gaza Ukraine

ANNA OWEN Area: Governorates of Qalqiliya and Tulkarem United Kingdom

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
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IAN SCHULER ICT Programs Manager United States

ARIAN TUTUNDJIAN LTO Coordinator West Bank and Gaza

ANNA LIZA YOUNAN Resident Administrative Assistant West Bank and Gaza




Deborah Hakes/The Carter Center

Election posters plaster the Palestinian side of the wall in El Ram.



A crowd gathers at a Fateh rally in Ramallah.

Deborah Hakes/The Carter Center



Election poster in downtown Ramallah.

Richard Gee/National Democratic Institute

Loading ballots and ballot boxes in Ramallah for distribution to polling centers.




Hamas rally outside Khan Younis, Gaza.

Richard Gee/National Democratic Institute



Outside a polling center as it closes in Gaza City.

Richard Gee/National Democratic Institute




Richard Gee/National Democratic Institute

Casting ballots on election day in Gaza City.




Checking names on the voter list in Gaza City.

Richard Gee/National Democratic Institute








President and Mrs. Carter at a poll closing in Jericho.



Posting results after the vote count in a polling station in Jericho.

Deborah Hakes/The Carter Center



The joint NDI/Carter Center press conference following the elections with Prime Minister Carl Bildt, the Hon. Ana Palacio, President Jimmy Carter, Mr. Kenneth Wollack, and President Rexhep Meidani.