ELECTION REPO₽T

Analyzing Bolivia's 2020 General Elections

Final Report



Analyzing Bolivia's 2020 General Elections

Final Report —• ‡ 2021

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The October 2019 elections were followed by post-electoral crisis that was characterized by extreme polarization between the country's political and social forces and numerous episodes of violence. Nonetheless in the midst of this crisis, complex negotiations enabled the unanimous approval of the Nov 24, 2019, Exceptional and Transitory Law for holding general elections. The

abandoning the preliminary results system in future processes and refrom the outset exclusively on the official results system provided for by law.

Out-of-Country Voting

The TSE demonstrated excellent organizational skills and great determination to guarantee that Bolivians abroad would be able to vote. The tors were made to ensure an accurate voter registry abroad, and the TSE produced training materials specifically for to be procedures. One of the many challenges the TSE had to face was that of communication with voters abroad, which cannot be boosted through media and publicity programs. In this respect, it could be useful to dedicate a specific part of the TSE website and consider creating social network pages exclusively for voters abroad After extensive and complex negotiation sout-of-country voting was facilitated in all countries where Bolivia has diplomatic or consular representation, with the exception of Panama and five cities in rorthern Chile, due to local COVID related movement restrictions. On Oct 18, Bolivians voted from 70 cities in 29 countries. In all, 301,631 voters were registered to vote outside the country.

National Election Observation

After several yearsof reduced activity in this field, Bolivian civil society organizations launched large-scale, accredited missions to observe the 2020 elections. The two main missions were Observa Bolivia and ObservaciórCiudadana de la Democracia (OCD) ach composed of numerous civil society organizations, associations and academic institutions. Both missions observed the election process from the early stages; Observa Bolivia and abroad. Bothgroups published objective and evidence based reports.

The TSE's regulation for election observation provides a framework that facilitates national and international observation. Observers have the right to coverall stages of the election process provided they maintain a commitment to noninterference, objectivity, and impartiality. The TSE granted accreditation to all the organizations that applied.

Participation of Women

After the Oct 18 general election, the Legislative Assembly for the 2022/025 period will have gender parity, a huge achievement at theinternational level. Specifically, the Senate will be composed of 20 women (556% of the total 36 seats) and 16 men (44%), while the Chamber of Deputies will have 62 women (477% of the total 130 seats) and 68 men (52%). For the first time since it became a legal requirement, all political organizations presented gendealanced candidate lists, where women represented52% of all lists for the National Assembly and supranational assemblies. This positive development was in large part thanks to the TSE's insistence that political organizations comply with the legal requirements for gender parity and alternance, alongside

remote communities a1o30 eov(e)]TJ 8de(mu)-0.9acie

INTRODUCTION

In response to an invitation extended by the Plurinational Electoral Body Órgano Electoral Pls1 Tf 0.087 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC – Tw (.503j EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (3r)-1.9O (t)1EP.7 (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2a)3.7s1 Tfaci2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i2.1 2al]/ EMC /P <<5.8m (s1 Tf 2.1 (r)i

5. OEP websiteThe TSE published a wide range of documents concerning all electoral preparations, including lists of voting certer staff and training materials and calendars. Toptimize public access to the information published by the TSEThe Carter Centerrecommends thatthe OEPsimplify and reorganize the layout of itswebsite to give clearer priority to publications directly relevant to the ongoing electoral process and make it easier to identify newer posts while giving less prominence to the more abstract and older publications. The page the TSE created just after the 2020 elections, presenting key elements of the process, is a good example of possible layout improvements for future processes.

6. Electoral administration. Many of the electoral preparations are carried out by the TSE's electoral processes department, which is responsible for production and pairing of all election materials used in Bolivia, as well as for organizing the out f-country voting. The department's responsibilities are heavily operational The Centerrecommends that administrative approval for recruit ment and disbursements beadapted to the complex and timesensitive needs of the electoral processes department.

7. Results publication. Given the reliability and transparency of the official results aggregation process, and the significant difficulties of ensuring that the preliminary results system is sufficiently representative of the elections results, The Carter Center recommends that unless a more financially feasible, fully representative and realistically implementable system is found, the TSEshould consider abandoning the preliminary results system in future processes and rely from the outset exclusively on the official results system provided for by law.

8. Out-of-country vote. One of the many challenges of rganizing the out-of-country vote is that of communicating with voters, particularly in the earlier phases of election preparations, before electoral staff has been selected, as unlike inside Bolivia, communication cannot be boosted through media and publicity programs The Center recommends that the TSE consider dediorage a specific part of its websiteded ded

17. Rights of indigenous peoples. 2007, Bolivia enacted Law 3760, which enshrines the Jnited Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into binding national law. Bolivia has taken other positive steps in this regard, including establishing seven special constituencies for indigenous communities (AIOC) in the Lower House and establishing the right and procedure to constitute autonomous native rural entities. However, indigenous sets overnment is sometimes rejected by parts of the population (mainly women and youth), since indigenous customs sometimes mean that only elder men on act as representatives. The Carter Center recommends that Bolivia explore mechanisms to harmonize the provisions of indigenous community customs with constitutional rights.

18. Indigenous people's participation The Carter Centernoted the efforts of the TSE to facilitate the participation of indigenous peoples in the 2020 election. The TSE reached out directly to indigenous communities located in the seven departments with special indigenous circumscriptions. The TSE visited dives and remote communities and provided information and

majority in both chambers, although it lost thetwo-thirds majority

a complaint against the MAS alliance on these grounds, calling the cancellation of its legal status and, consequently, the cancellation of all MAS candidacies.

The Carter Center recommendshat Bolivia consider replacing the sanction of cancellation of a political party's legal status, currentlyprovided for by Articles 136.III of the LRE and 58.1(k) of the LOP, with other sanctions that aremore proportionate to the sanctioned offenses and that do not jeopardize political pluralism.

Electoral legislation does not establish campaign spending limits, except for spending on political advertising in the media, which can lead to great inequities resources for competing parties. In this respect, and with a view to a more level playingield for political competitors, The Carter Center recommends that Bolivia consider establiTc -0.03M wornd193 (n)-2.8 (d)-3.9 (5)-g Tc 0.001 Tw [(i)-7

right [and] where registration of voters is required, it should be facilitated, and obstacles to such registration should not be imposed?⁷

In Bolivia, all citizens 18 years andolder have the right to vote, and voting is obligatory. For Bolivians age 70 or moe, or who are outside the country at the time of the election, administrative penalties for not voting do not apply For 90 days after elections, citizens who cannot provide either a voting certificate (certificado de sufragio) or proof of having paid the fine for not voting may not access public office, nor carry out bank transactions, nor obtain a passport. For the 2020 elections, the TSE established the fine for not voting at 10% of the minimum salary.further declared that those who could provide evidence that they were ill or impeded from voting by circumstance or force majeure would also be exemptirom penalty.⁸

245 outside. Of the 28,172 citizens who had been disqualified for not performing juradpolling staff) duties in previous elections a legal provision that confuses voter registry updating mechanisms with sanctions the TSE applied the state of limitations on this electoral offense (six months, according to the Election Law) and rehabilitated them on its own initiative in another measure clearly prioritizing inclusion.

In addition to the numerous measures taken to maximize inclusion and

brought by the government against MAS leaders, as well as arrests of several MAS candidates in connection to the roadblocks in July and August.

Campaign Financing

Legislativa

informing poll workers of their selection. According b the plan for the DIREPRE preliminary results system, voting center coordinators were responsible for sending results. TEDs were given significant discretion to determine schedules for selectingrad training voting center coordinators; in some cases this contributed to overlapping timeframes, whereby some voting center coordinators were still being recruited or trained at a time when their services were already required, for example to notify selected poll workers or participate in DIREPRE trials.

The Carter Center considers that overall, the degree of autonomy afforded to tfleEDs for implementation of electoral preparations was appropriate, particularly in conjunction with close ongoing communication between theTSE andthe TEDs and among theTEDs.Nonetheless,the Center recommends areview of the areas in which harmonization is essential and the implementation of checks to ensure progress, such as deadlines for selection of electoral staff, to ensure there are no overlaps between this stage of electoral preparations and others, such as training.

The OEPinvested heavily in training its nationwide network of temporary staff, most particularly the voting center coordinators, responsible for electoral materials and communicatinglection results, and the more than 200,000poll workers, responsible for all voting and counting

Election Day

As noted above, due to the small size and limited scope of the missiohe Carter Center was not able to conduct robust observation of voting and counting procedures and aggregation of results by the TEDs. As a result of these limitations, the content referring to observations on election day largely relies on the findings of the two main national citizen observation networks, Observa Bolivia and Observación Ciudadana de la Democracia (O,OD) ich The Carter Center thanks for their openness.

According to reports by the main observation missions, election day was wedrganized and smoothly implemented; according to official figures from the TSE, turnout was historically high at 88%.¹⁹

The TSE had prepared a series of COVINS pired biosecurity measures, which were publicized well

consider specifically legislating the state's obligation to publish information on its agencies' work, both on a regular basis and in response tooquiries.

Impact of COVID-19 on the Election

The COVID

elevates the United Nations Declaration on the Righst of Indigenous Peoples to national binding law (2007); Law 45 against racism and any form of discrimination (2010)Law 243 on political harassment and violence against women (2012)Law 342 on Youth (2013) and Law 348 to guarantee women a life free of violence (2013).

However, implementation of these laws at thenational and local leves is still a challenge The principles and guarantees contained in these progressive laws also require a strong judicial system and adequate support so they can be applied properly key example, which will be detailed below, is Law 243 on political harassment and violence against women. While Bolivia became the first country in the Americas with this type of regulation, is results have been limited. The Carter Center recommends that the Bolivian state provide sufficient institutional, human, material and financial resources of ensure implementation of and compliance with these laws.

A positive development is the work of the TSE tostrengthen inclusion. Starting in 2016, the TSE has conducted internal performance assessments considering the needs and interests of key groups with five different approaches: gender, generational, plurinational, intercultural and people with disabilities. The 2020 evaluation focuse on the TSE's workin three areas: registration and integration of candidate lists following parity and alternation criteria, training materials, and public information campaigns.

Participation of Women

Bolivia has made great progress in strengthening wei

political organizations to replace ineligible candidates (July 5); drafting and sharing a report on compliance of parity and alternation criteria in candidate lists (July 29); a call asking alleight political organizations to publicly pledge to support gender equality through signing a formal commitment (Aug. 27); a meeting between the TSE's gender unit political organizations to share the state of their candidate lists (Aug28); and bilateral meetings with political party delegates to review their lists and provide support to make sure they nee the legal requirements (Oct. 8). These meetings were hosted by the TSE with the participation of the chamber secretary and the gender unit, while the NGO network women's coordinator"³¹ participated as observer.

As a result, for the first time, all political organizations presented genderbalanced candidate lists, with 52% female representation in all lists for the National Assembly and the Andean Parliament. It is important to highlight that Article 107 of the Electoral Law establishes that when political organizations fail to meet the requirements of alternation and parity, their entirecandidate list shall not be admitted.

The Oct 18, 2020, general election results led to gender parity in the Legislative Assembly for the 2020-2025 period. Specifically, the Senate will be composed **20** women (55.6% of the total 36 seats) and 16 men (444%), while the Chamber of Deputies will have 62 women (4**7**% of the total 130 seats) and 68 men (528%). Out of the 62 women deputies, 31 were elected by proportional representation, 27 by majority, and four as indigenous deputies. Figure 1 (next pa) electron the gender composition of the National Assembly.

³¹ Coordnadora de la Mujer (2020)Quienes somo's Available at: http://www.coordinadoradelamujer.org.bo/web/index.php/qsomos/intro

Figure 1. PlurinationalLegislative Assembly of Bolivia: Percentage/100/00men inBoth Houses.

Senate, 20202025

Source: TSE data.

Chamber of Deputies, 2020025

Source: e dea.

Political violence against women

In 2012 Bolivia proclaimed Law 243 on harassment and political violence against women. This law is especially important as the strengthening of women's representation in government positions has unfortunately been accompanied by an increase in violence against themeTaw has enabled cases to be presented and has made harassment and violence more visible. Moreoverlatw is in line with Bolivia's international commitments, including the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Intermetican Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against ownen, better known as the Belém do Pará Convention.

However, the principles and guarantees set fortin the law also require a strong judicial system and adequate support so they can bepplied. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. According to the Association of Women Councilors of Bolivia (ACOBOL), 589 cases of harassment and political violence against councilwomen were presented between 2010 and 2019. None of them resulted in effective sanctions. The Carter Center recommends the provision of

Another area of opportunity is the inclusion of the LGBTQI community in political party platforms. The Carter Center conducted a content analysis ofhe electoral platforms of the eight original political organizations registered for the 2020 presidential election. The analysis focused on identifying mentions of a) relevant international instruments b) relevant key words (such as "LGBTQI community/rights," "(sexual) diversity," "gender identity," etc., and c) public policy proposals for these groups. Findings revealed that while there are light references to human rights, to gender equality, and to the importance of diversity, none of the political orgaizations specifically mentioned the LGBTQI community or LGBTQI rights in their platforms. The Carter Center calls on all politicalorganizations to consider the rights, interests, and needs of all groups in society, and the LGBTQI community in particular.

new young voters between 18 and 20 years old. The Carter Center encourages similar efforts that complement the permanent voter registration procedure.

During the 2020electoral process, the TSE and departmental electoral tribunals conducted various activities to reach out and engage with youth organizations across the country for disseminating election information, voting procedures and other key participation topics. The Carter Center commends these efforts especially the TSE sponsored dialogues with young women candidates

Verification organizations played a fundamental role in decting and countering these disinformation campaigns. Chequea Boliviathe Carter Center's local partner, Bolivia Verificand Universidad Católica de Boliviatentified, analyzed, and checked most of the false or misleading messages spread on social networks during this campaign.


On the basis of its analysis of disinformation on social media, The Carter Center recommends that the TSE consider reaching agreements with the leading social networks to provide access to their systems so that the entities autbrized by the tribunal can monitor content, as is done with traditional media. In the same vein, the TSE could reach agreements with the leading social networks to enable mechanisms for reporting suspicious activity to themot facilitate a rapid response.

In addition, it would be helpful for the TSE's monitoring **f** political parties were required to communicate their candidates' social network profiles, to monitor what they publish.


A comprehensive Carter Center analysis of disinformation on social media during the negative and election campaign is presented as an annex to this port.

ANNEX A: DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA **DRJ**NGTHE BOLIVIAN 2020 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The Bolivian 2020general electioncampaign saw intense disinformation activity. The



MAS and CREEMOS, and their respective presidential candidates, Luis Arce and Luis Fernando Camacho, were the most frequent beneficiaries of falseroisleading narratives favorable to their nominations.



Evolution of Disinformation During the Campaign

From Aug. 18 to Sept. 1

In the first part of this study, the campaign was dominated by the second postponement of the elections, initially scheduled for May 3 and then for Sept. 6. Finally, it was agreed to hold them on Oct. 18. While they were still participating in the electoral contest, President Jeanine Áñez and former President Evo Morales were the main targets of false and misleading content pread on social networks.

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Disinformation to Harm Parties' or Electoral Authorities' Reputation
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From Sept. 2 to Sept. 18

In this period, three events in quick succession changed disinformation's development in the Bolivian campaign. On Sept. 2, Facebook suspended CLS Strategies' accounts for fraudulent use. This PRirm was hired . 5s40.219 0(e)6 (.)w 0Á 5s40.2ñ2.3 (e)-z ediisretin to w0.6 (s)-2.7

Some examples of disinformation targeting TSE and Salvador Romero.


Fake TSE Facebook page:




False accusations: USAID has an office in TSE's headquarters:



Presidential candidate Carlos Mesa dining with the president of TSE, Salvador Romero (four years ago):



False election fraud claims:



From Oct. 3 to Oct. 18

Some Presidential Candidates' Tweets Supporting Disinformation Narratives

Formats of Disinformation

In the Bolivian 2020 general election campaign, simple pictures and oof-context photos with false claims were the preferred formats of disinformation. No "deepfakes" or state-of-the-

Bots and Fraudulent Use of Social Media

On Twitter, bots³⁸ often are used to retweet some candidates' messages to give the false impression of widespread support for a candidate or opposition to a rival. It is not possible to know with certainty who operates these accounts. However, me tools allow us to detect bot activity with a degree of probability. It is also possible to analyze the discourse and how it works to know the objective pursued with that behavior and the politicians and parties that benefit from it.

More than 120,000 Twitter profiles ³⁹ that interacted with the candidates during the two months prior to the elections (Aug. 18 to Oct. 18, election day) were analyzed for fraudulent behavior. The Carter Center sent these accounts to the Botometer system of the Observatory of Social Media at Indiana University (USA), which uses an algorithm


Botnet Activity


Promotion of Thematic Labels (Hashtags)

Among the 50 hashtags most utilized by the bots, at least five were pMAS and proCC, and one proADN. These favorable labels mostly coincide with the campaign slogans of these political formations. Two anti-MAS hashtags were also widely utilized by fraudulent accounts, such as the hashtag #EvoPedófilo, which appeared following reports of the former Bolivian President's alleged relationships with minors.

Promotion of Campaign Messages and Disinformation

The party that benefited most from the botnets' artificial amplification was MASPSP, with more than 180,000 tweets or retweets. Most of them were messages from Luis Arce in the social network, which botnets helped gain more relevance in the Twitter ecosystem, a practice known as "astroturfing." Outside the official nominations, Evo Morales' messages also had generous support from these networks.





Example of support messages dissemination with botts rough the accounts of candidates or other electoral actors:



Examples of verbal aggressions directed at candidates from botnets:



5:42 a. m. · 14 oct. 2020 · Twitter for Android

- x Disinformation was widely spread on social networks before and during the campaign.
- x The narratives of this false and misleading content were aimed at discribing the candidates and sowing mistrust in the electoral process.
- x Some of these narratives were used in candidates' tweets to attack competitors.
- x Carlos Mesa (CC) was the most affected by disinformation, intended to show him as a politician who wouldcontinue Jeanine Áñez's policies and privatize Bolivian public assets.
- x Before their withdrawal from the electoral process, Evo Morales (MA&PSP) and Jeanine Áñez (JUNTOS) bore the most significant burden of false or misleading content.
- x Hate speech maily affected female candidates. Áñez was the main target of sexist messages.

Recommendations to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal:

- x Totally or partially finance the public or private entities in charge of tracking the digital media in which disinformation circulates.
- x Reach agreements with the leading social networks to provide free access to their systems so that the entities authorized by the tribunal can monitor the suspicious activity, as is done with the offline media.
- x Reach agreements with the leading social networks to enable mechanisms for reporting suspicious activity to facilitate a rapid response from these companies.
- x Require parties to register and publish the social network profiles of their candidates to monitor their activity and identify illegitimate networks that intend to interfere with their campaigns.

† Campaignfinance reports to be made public to promote transparency and accountability.

To the Plurinational Electoral Body (OEP):

- x Require political candidatesto submit social media account URLs used for campaign purposes with candidate nomination submissions.
- x Establish a dedicated oversight mechanism to monitor social media political advertisements in accordance with regulations.
- x Establish a formal complaint mechanismand process to receive political advertising complaints.
- x Establish an online reporting mechanism to encourage social media users to report advertisements that may contravene regulations. Facebook does not restrict political advertisements to election candidates.

To Facebook:

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Why The Carter Center Is Analyzing Social Media Political Advertising

The right to advertise political ideas during an electoral process is enshrined in threight to freedom of expression. However, political advertising may be subject to reasonable limitations through regulations imposed by domestic law: who can run political advertisements, when and where advertisements may be run, restrictions on advertising expenditure levels, and reporting and disclosure requirements. These kinds of regulations are important to ensuring transparency, accountability and a level playing field.

In accordance withUnited NationsGuidelines and Principles on Business and Human Rights, countries are responsible for devising and enforcing laws requiring social media platforms to respect human rights. They have to periodically assess the adequacy of the previous elections, and for 2020, was fixed **a3**5,060,000 Bolivianos.However, in 2020, this amount was not given to political parties, and vas instead diverted to ensuring biosecurity measures and materials to avoid Covid9 contagion during the elections (Law 1314 of 24th July 2020, Transitional Lawe-assigning public funds for campaigning). According to the TSE, the figure the ceiling for total spending on political advertising still stood despite this reassignment of public funds, and as such no party could spend more than 12,271,000 Bolivanos (approximately 1,778,500 US dollars) on political advertising in the media for the 2020 elections.

Are There Requirements for Political Advertising Expenditure Reporting and Disclosure? Through mechanisms further regulated by the OEP, political parties must present accounts of their capital and funding sources at the time that elections are called, as well as an updated balance within 60 days of election day, which must include detailsad spending on electoral propaganda (Articles 265 & 266, Election Law).

Are There Limits on the Number of Advertisements That Can Be Run? Limits on advertising amounts exist for print and broadcast, but not for social media. A political party may not run more than 10 minutes of paid propaganda on each television and radio station. In print, a party may pay for up to two advertising pages per day in each newspaper and a 12page weekly supplement. (Article 118, Election Law). Television spots may be up to 30 seconds long, and for radio, advertising may last up to one minute at a time (Article 48, Regulation on Electoral Propaganda 2020).

Are There Requirements for Political Advertisements to Be Labeled with a Disclaimer? o)pr0 Tm [lsi, th1 (l)-3.3 (m)-3.3 (n(l)1.2g)4 (t)-1.8 ()-0c 0 Tu(l)12 (o)t1 (l b(l)5on)-(b6.4 (t(s)-2.7 (e)0.7 (c))) propaganda; and registering political parties, auditing their spending in general and on campaigning in particular.

Are Violations Enumerated in Political Advertising Regulations? The following violations are enumerated in the OEP Regulation on Propaganda and Election Campaigning and Article 119 of the Election Law:

- x Advertising prior to the permitted campaign timeframe
- x Advertising during the campaign silence period
- x Advertising that uses opinion pollsfor electoral gain
- x Advertising that contravenes the provisions on disseminating electoral propaganda (i.e., run by anoncontestant who is prohibited from running advertisements)
- x Advertising that is anonymous (i.e., does not include a disclaimer)
- x Advertising that promotes electoral abstention
- x Advertising that violates the honor, dignity or privacy of candidates or citizens
- x Advertising that directly or indirectly promotes violence, discrimination, or intolerance
- x Advertising that implies the offer ofmoney or goods
- x Advertising that makes direct or indirect use of religious symbols
- x Advertising that uses national symbols or e the of5 Inaona7.2 (nd)16.6 (e)0.7 (r)(e)01 Tf5 of omot

Social Media Advertising Policy Analysis

Facebook has established selfegulatory policies regarding "ads about social issues, elections or politics" on its platform. These policies are found on different pageare frequently updated, and vary by country. In some cases, Facebook sreligulatory policies may be consistent— or fa65.678 Td [(S)-7.1 (oc)-2()-0.6 n.6 (o)-4.6 (ut)-6oc.8 (1Tc 0 Tw0 Td (c

the country they want to run ads in." The policy further stipulates that. If relevant authorities make us aware of an ad that is in v

information deemed to be false may have restrictions placed on their ability to advertise on Facebook."


Facebook'spolicy on discriminatory practices is comprehensive and encompasses a wide range of practices that may be considered discriminatory based on protected characteristics. However, it may reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting political advertisements that contain hatespeechor incitement speech or aim to disenfranchise discrete segments of the populationFacebook's policy ormisinformation is straightforward, and it may reasonably be assumed that an election management body or election observation organization wouldconstitute an organization



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Advertising Outside Permitted Period



Facebook Ads Outside Advertising Period: Candidate

Served Bais Medice (NUNTOO)		ad			
Carlos Mesa (CC)	32		St	atus	
Jeanine Áñez (JUNTOS)				vermeu	
Chi Hyun Chung (FPV)				- Unverified	
S. JIFILS M. ORIGICI J (009Stell)					
Luis Fernando Camacho (CREE), 🛺 🔤 🛛 🗖 2					
at the Tutania Ouiroga (LIBRE 2156		-			
Roger 'Pēte' Qūiroga (JUNTOK 🗐 📃 🖉		-	46		
Papiers (CO)					
Sergio Miranda (CC) 13					
Rourey weitlason Join US					
Carla Sittyc (11 INT Sector 7					
Erwin Villalba (CC) - 6					
Guido Calcina (6 7		st.			
Gustavo Pedraza (CC) 5					
Juan 💵 d ise Torréz î(CC) 🔲 🔠 🔠					
Franz Gutierrez (CC) 4	8				
Daniela Cabrera (JUNN 🔤 S) 💼 👫	*				
Carla Ulloa (CC) 🔜 4					
Mónica 🖓 🖓 😓 🖛 🔺					
Ranno ปกฎณากู/MSATOr					
Rodrigo Partie Concercio					
Lily Ramos Rojas (JUNTOS)					
Ninosat					
Barinia García Bellido (CC) 🔤 3					
Magaly Gómez (MA 1000)					
Mariela Baldivieso (CC)					
Jerges Mergada (* (MAURER) - 7 2 4					
Magali Rojaš Lijavez UNNCOS	1		(11
Griselda Muñoz (JUNTOS)					
Luis 'Lucho' Arce (MAS-IPSP)					
Silvia Salame (CC)			W	='	8
Lino Dávila (MAS-IPSP) 1					
Paties in Bartmentos (UNIOS) 1					
Janes Ministration (CON)					
Mario Cavero (JUNTOS)					
Rudolf Knijnenhurg (JUNTOS)					
Gladye Alarcon (MAS-IDSD)	*				
Lola Terrazas (C.c.)					
Thalyson Kruger (JUNTOS) 1					
Adrián 🚟 🖓 🖓 Gandarillas (CC) 1					
Carlos Baldivieso (JUNTOS) 1					
Karen Saavedra 200					
Alejandra Sanchez velasquez (CC) I					
Simona Quispe (MAS-IPSD)					
Marcolo Pertorazas (CU) 1 -					
Lily Margoth Zutita (JUNTOS)					
Roger Mario Castellón (JUNTOS) 1 Alcides Villagómez (JUNTOS) 1					
	20	40	<u> </u>		
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Facticebook AdStruits de Advents no Recipión Vêntied and Unvêntied Candidates

Number of addition

Conclusions

Based on its analysis of Bolivian political advertising regulations via-vis social media advertising, The Carter Cented etermined the following:

x Political advertising is defined as "every message spread in a space or time contracted by political organi

not restrict when entities can run political advertisements provided they obtain authorization from Facebook according to its platform policies.

Х

- x At a minimum, Facebook should have abided by the provision of restricting political advertising to permitted entities and within the designated campaign period.
- x Facebook failed to enforce its selfegulatory policy effective Aug 5, 2020, that required political parties and candidates campaigning in upcoming elections to complete the authorization process and placePaid for by" disclaimers on all of their ads.
- x It is understood that social media platforms are exempted from media registration requirements applicable to domestic media and, in turn, not required to provide equal and consistent advertising rates to candidates From a registration

should be given to requiring that archives be maintained and published once candidates submit nomination documents.

x Require social media platforms to restrict advertisements to permitted campaign periods. At minimT8.1 Tc -0.001011.9 e ti s een ts b 11. (y()-0.6 (p)1.4 (o)-2.2 lm)-1.7 & 75.8 (c75.8 ous-.5 ns0153 (t75.2 (e)-3 be)281 (i).0010l(i).033 tc-1)4.6 y at platforms and establish direct reporting procedures to enable platforms to immediately remove advertisements that contravene regulations, as determined by OEP.

- x Establish a formal complaint mechanism and process to receive political advertising complaints. As noted above, the OEP has no exact legal role stipulated for the OEP in receiving complaints during the election period or in adjudicating them. Consequently, molicies regulate the acceptance of complaints during the election nor procedures or forms to submit them.
- x Establish an online reporting mechanism to encourage social media users to report advertisements that may contravene regulations. Facebook does not restrict political advertisements to election andidates therefore, noncandidatesmay run advertisements. The establishment of an online reporting mechanism would enable election observation groups and citizens alike to bring potential violations to the attention of the OEP to decide whether such advertisements violate regulations.

<u>To Facebook</u>

- x Maintain and publish archives of all advertisements run by elected officials and political parties . Regardless of the time when they are run, and whether they may be considered political or not, advertisements run by elected officials and political parties are in the public interest and should be made publicly available by default.
- x Archive and publish all advertisements from accounts of election candidates that submit their Facebook URL s during the candidate nomination process to the OEP. If the OEP does not requite RLsubmission, Facebook should obtain lists of election and datesofficially recognized by the OEP. Then reach out to political parties and candidates to obtain the UsRo Lthe Facebook pages they are using for campaign purposend archive and publish all advertisements run by those accounts.
- x Provide a custom, publicly accessible web interface to present all advertisements by registered political parties and candidates contesting elections.

of actual cost data, Facebook should include such data to facilitate the evaluation of compliance of campaign finance expenditure oversight.

- x Conduct digital awareness raising to ensure all advertisers are educated on political advertising regulations . Absent assuming gatekeeper responsibility, and beyond merely placing the onus of compliance with political advertising regulations on advertisers themselves, Ebook should, at a minimum, assume responsibility for providing regulatory information. Education applicable political advertising regulations in Bolivia should not be a substitute for assuming intermediary responsibility, but it would be a positive gene to mitigate potential harms.
- x Provide customized violation reporting on advertisements to enable Facebook users to report violations of political advertising regulations. At present, Facebook enables users to report violations of advertisements **uts**der

and a large number of likely legislative candidates beginning in March 2020. To identify noncandidatesthat may run Facebook political advertisements, Baldassaro conducted a snowball sample of Facebook accounts that shared content from the pages of likely presidential and vicepresidential candidates in April 2020.

To capture all political advertising data for monitoring and analysis purposes, The Carter Center checkedially whether pages were running ads and collected data from the Facebook Ad Library while ads were actively running. This data was stored in a third party archive for data analysis purposes. To capture archived data to evaluate the effectiveness of Facebook'policy requiring advertisers to obtain authorization, The Carter Center collected available data vian application programming interface.

Data analysis was performed by Pedro de Alzaga, a journalisith more than 25 years' experience, dataspecialist, and social media analystAdvertisement fact-checking was performed by The Carter Center local partner in Bolivia, Chequea Bolivia.