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**The Carter Center**

**Timor-Leste Parliamentary  
Election Observation 2007**

**Final Report**



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Summary of Findings

Despite a newly established National Election Commission (CNE), revised election procedures, and a deeply divided electorate, Timor-Leste's Parliamentary elections were held without serious mishap, complaints, or violence that would undermine the validity of the results. Initial concerns voiced over the uneven cooperation between the CNE and the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE) diminished with evidence of a growing collaborative relationship between the two bodies at national and district levels.

The Carter Center deployed an international election observation mission to assess the June 30, 2007, Parliamentary elections. Observers visited 12 of Timor-Leste's 13 districts during the campaign period, the election, and the count. These observers focused on the procedural preparations for the elections, with particular emphasis on the role of youth in the election process, a topic that receives special emphasis in this report.

With the exception of the killing of two men in Viqueque and the burning of homes in Ermera, campaign-related violence was low. Some political violence rested upon long-standing divisions stimulated by historical conflicts over land, resources, or affiliations during the resistance against

Indonesian occupation (1975-1998). The low level of pre-election-related violence was possibly due to a more politically mature electorate, increased institutional emphasis on transparency, and the visible presence of foreign and Timorese police at every phase of the election process.

Personalities rather than party policies often predominated during the election campaign. Neon l Tc 0.004 Tw T\*2(s)-0 -4(aiTJ-0.004 T-i)-



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### **Brief History of Timor-Leste Before 1975**

The nation of Timor-Leste, with an estimated population of 800,000, occupies approximately half of a small island off of the northwestern coast of Australia. The nation also includes the small enclave of Oecusse on the northwest coast of the island and the islands of Atauro and Jaco.

Timor-Leste's history of occupation began in the 16th century with the arrival of Portuguese traders who were chiefly interested in the island's sandalwood. A ship of Magellan's fleet was the first European vessel to visit the island on Jan. 26, 1522. By this time, Timor had been trading its sandalwood with merchants from China, Java, and Malacca for centuries. The Dutch arrived at the western half of the island in 1652. They began a struggle with the





The 1974 military coup in Portugal sparked an increase in political activity in Timor-Leste, with Timorese dividing around the issue of independence. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), Timorese Popular Democratic Association (APODETI), the Association of Timorese Heroes (KOTA), and the Association of Timorese Social Democrats (ASDT) emerged as key players. During this period, ASDT transformed itself into the Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (Fretilin). UDT favored a continued association with Portugal, while APODETI favored integration of Timor-Leste into Indonesia. These groups, along with KOTA, aligned themselves against Fretilin,









## **ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK**



A complaints process was instituted that allowed aggrieved voters or party agents to appeal to a team of CNE lawyers in the national capital. The law also established procedures for resolving disputes at the polling-station level on election day. Under the complaints procedures described in the election law, any registered voter or party agent who witnessed a violation or incident was allowed to lodge a complaint with CNE. During the campaign period, complaints could be registered for unfair access to media, bias by public agencies, vote buying, and intimidation.

Election day complaints were made orally to polling station officials and then in writing to CNE if they could not be resolved. Complaints on election day were permitted for procedural errors and



argued that it would enhance the ability of local and U.N. police to provide adequate security during the counting process and that it would also reduce the potential for intimidation because the votes of an individual polling station would not be known.

However, the amendment also raised concerns about the transparency of the new counting procedure and about the ability of STAE and CNE to adequately

train their staff and conduct the appropriate voter education programs in time for the election. Domestic and international critics worried that voters would not understand why counting was being moved to district offices and questioned why a procedure that had worked well during the presidential election was being changed at the last minute. The amendment also presented new logistical challenges related to the security and transport of ballots.









occupation. PSD support comes from Baucau, Dili, and former UDT strongholds in districts such as Ermera.

PSD first joined ASDT in a coalition followed by the July 6, 2007, coalition with CNRT and PD to win a ruling majority in Parliament. As the former

founder of Fretilin, Francisco do Amaral identified with the party leaders as fellow patriots of Timor-Leste. However, he saw real weaknesses in Fretilin's political performance, which he believed could be corrected through cooperative labor of many parties, regions, and political backgrounds.





### **Carter Center Long-Term Observers**

The LTOs were selected based upon their knowledge and experience in Timor-Leste as well as their language skills (including Bahasa Indonesia, Tetum, or Portuguese, with some observers who spoke two of the three languages). Several observers had also participated in previous Carter Center election observation missions, providing the invaluable opportunity for the Center to sustain relationships with civil society and political leaders in local communities.

During the campaign period, LTOs were deployed in teams of two to 12 of 13 districts in Timor-Leste, the exception being the enclave of Oecussi in West Timor. On election day, delegates observed voting in 56 polling stations in seven districts (Lautém, Bobonaro, Ermera, Viqueque, Liquiçá, Dili, and Manatuto). While the territory's small size was an advantage and enabled teams to visit many districts and subdistricts each week, limited telecommunications capacity, the mountainous terrain, and poor road conditions presented operational challenges.

Once deployed, LTOs met with STAE and CNE district administrators, representatives from the United Nations Police (UNPol) and Timor-Leste

National Power (is)1(i)-2(n, a)e-5(.)TJe-5(c6(en)-14(g)6(es-6(i)-6(v)-4(es)-5( f)-1(r)-1()-6( )TJ)-5( ce1.15 T  
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Political parties tried to prevent the recurrence of the negative campaigning prevalent during the presidential elections by ratifying a political party accord (code of conduct) prior to the start of the campaign period. The accord condemned electoral violence and intimidation and committed parties to resolving disputes through dialogue. It also proclaimed parties' belief in democratic principles such as transparency, inclusion, participation, and accountability. While the political parties' initiative to create peaceful campaign conditions was welcomed, sporadic incidents of violence in the first week of campaigning prompted questions about the effective implementation of the accord.

Two lethal incidents occurred during the first week of the campaign in Viqueque. The first episode occurred on June 3 during a campaign speech by CNRT leader Xanana Gusmão. CNRT supporter Afonso da Silva died after clashing with a local policeman and an alleged Fretilin supporter. Two days later, local police fired on a group of youth throwing stones at Gusmão's passing vehicle, resulting in another death and an injury. These events generated distrust and uncertainty that may have discouraged some Timorese from participating more fully in the electoral campaign.

In another serious incident, house burnings in subdistrict Hatiola B (Ermera district) displaced more than 60 families in May and resulted in a lower voter turnout in the presidential election compared to the national average. Citizens remaining in the village said

they were afraid to vote in the parliamentary elections. In an attempt to restore voter confidence, district administrators, STAE and CNE officials, party members, church leaders, and house-burning victims convened a dialogue on June 7. Attendees agreed to maintain a peaceful and secure environment, especially for their children who had stopped attending school due to the violence.

CNE attentiveness to irregularities is illustrated by a case of political intimidation in Lautém. A *chefe de suco* (village chief) in the *suco* of Home in Los Palos refused to allow parties other than Fretilin to campaign in his area. The CNE met with the *chefe de suco* political parties, and U.N. security officers to resolve the issue peacefully. The *chefe de suco* signed an agreement not to obstruct campaigns by other parties, but refused to guarantee their security in the *suco*. The CNE monitored the situation for the rest of the campaign and did not report additional problems.

During the weeks following these attacks, the security situation throughout the country stabilized. A U.N. spokesperson described the atmosphere of the second week of campaigning as calm, and Carter Center LTOs reported that the U.N. police did not expect security issues to disrupt voting. For the most part, parties tended to



to violent confrontations in the first and last weeks of the campaign period.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and Belun, a Timorese nongovernmental organization (NGO), reported that in the two weeks before the elections, 35 people were wounded by election violence, down from 37 in the previous two weeks.<sup>6</sup> Incidents were reported in all districts except Manufahi, with Baucau and Ermera having the most incidents—seven each. In all, monitors verified 45 incidents, with almost a quarter of these occurring on the last day of campaigning. Political party supporters were the ones most



regarding the new counting procedures. STAE, United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), local brigades, and NGOs conducted voter education that focused on explaining polling and counting procedures in hope of reducing the number of invalid votes. Despite these efforts, election staff told Carter Center observers that they still worried that many citizens were unaware of the change and would protest the transport of ballot boxes to district count centers.

In contrast to reports received about the presidential elections, Center observers reported that CNE and STAE cooperated well during the lead-up to the parliamentary elections. Improved relations between the two electoral bodies contributed to organized and professional election preparations. CNE and STAE also collaborated well with PNTL and the United Nations to ensure a safe polling environment and successful distribution of voting materials. In Viqueque, STAE officials who initially worried that election material would not be distributed before the elections were able to deliver supplies a day earlier than scheduled.

Carter Center observers also noted the security preparations undertaken by UNPol, PNTL, and International Security Forces (ISF) to ensure a safe voting environment. Assigning risk levels to polling stations was an effective way to prioritize the deployment of security officers to the areas with the greatest potential for conflict.

Heavy rainfall in Manufahi, Ainaro, Viqueque, Lautém, and Cova Lima in the week before voting presented unforeseen logistical challenges and strained scarce resources. Election officials and the United Nations responded as efficiently as their limited resources allowed to deliver voting materials to polling centers isolated by collapsed bridges and impassable roads. Limited helicopter assistance delayed the arrival of materials at six polling stations in Viqueque. Fortunately the rain ceased before the election, resolving the question of how to transport ballot boxes to district counting centers should more roads become impassable.

In the days immediately prior to the election, the Carter Center leadership delegation, led by David Pottie and Jeff Carter, met with the leaders of all the major parties, including Fretilin Secretary-General Marí Alkatiri, CNRT President Xanana \* X V P, ~~PR~~ President Fernando Araújo La Sama, and ASDT and PSD leaders Xavier do Amaral and Mario Viegas Carrascaloa, respectively.

Additionally, the team met with President José Ramos Horta and President of Parliament Francisco Guterres Lu Olo. Among international organizations, Carter Center team members conducted meetings with U.N. Chief Electoral Officer Steven Wagenseil, as well as leaders of the EU international election observation mission, IFES, and the International Republican Institute (IRI).



## YOUTH AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

One of the main objectives of the Center's observation mission was to focus on the political participation of youth, as they remain a marginalized group in political processes. This is a particularly salient issue since 75 percent of Timor-Leste's population is under the age of 30. An increase in youth migration to cities has been accompanied by a rise in violence, most notably during the 2006 crisis. Many of the tensions that Timor-Leste has experienced since independence can be traced to youth disenchantment with the status quo or to





For example, the head of the Democratic Party is Fernando La Sama, the former leader of a pro-independence student organization in Indonesia, RENETIL.

New youth are generally considered to be 15-24 years old, and involved in diverse social organizations, from religious groups to martial arts groups to political parties. These groups can provide their members with security, community, identity, and activity. Some groups are formed specifically to promote peace and unity or to resolve conflicts, and others to play sports or practice martial arts.

The generational definition highlighted in the indigenous category of **Geracão Foun** includes processes of education, colonialism, and linguistic capabilities. This is in contrast to that of members of



(OPJLATIL), a youth wing of the new political movement established by Xanana \* X V P after it was decided that Fretilin (political wing) and Falintil (military wing) would be separate entities within the resistance movement.



## **Inward Migration**

One of the primary reasons given for a high incidence of youth-on-youth violence is the tension felt between recent migrant youth and long-term migrants or established youth communities. Youth are now the largest migrant community in Dili, and most migrate without their parents. According to the 2004 census, youth aged 15-34 account for 34 percent of the population (43 percent in Dili). More than half of these youth migrated to Dili between 2002 and 2004.

While youth can join groups easily, they have a much harder time finding work. In Dili, 60 percent of 15-to-19-year-olds and 50 percent of 20-to-24-year-olds are unemployed.

When youth migrate, they tend to seek out kin or ethnic peers from their region, village, or extended families living in Dili. According to the Hak Foundation, new migrants relocated to empty housing units abandoned by Indonesian government employees stationed in Dili prior to independence. Because these homes have no fixed ownership, they are subject to rival claims in which resident youth fight with migrants over squatting rights. Local youth fought with these migrants in areas such as Kampung Alor, Fatuhada, Hudi Laran, and Villa Verde Mata Duru of Dili. There are very few conflicts, even between politically opposed residents, in long-standing residential communities.

It is difficult to credit Dili's internal migration entirely with causing the sudden upsurge in violence since Dili has always had high levels of internal

migration, but the very young age of migrants and massive increase in their number exacerbated the situation. To make matters worse, after the number of U.N. employees diminished in 2001-2002, service sector labor opportunities also diminished drastically. High gasoline prices, marked inflation, and a decrease in cash flow for young labor resulted in the relative absence of organized, non-village-based employment.

The primary means that youth have to meet their peers is through involvement



dramatically from the Fretilin party leaders who tend to take a more measured and cautious approach to political action. Fretilin party leaders act to strengthen the party, fortify its economic and political interests, and protect it from criticism. These two different styles of thinking rest in two different periods (pre- and post-clandestine movement) and two different generations (the elder Fretilin functionaries and younger Indonesia-trained youth).

Some individual youth leaders, such as Joao da Silva—alias “Choque” (Punch)—have varied credentials, with a background in the clandestine movement, a mystical sect, and various political party links. People such as Choque are believed to be useful for their ability to mobilize youth without having any role in defining the ideological basis for any one movement.

In 2006, a new generation of neighborhood-level operators tended to act more like Choque than loyalists to any single cause. In this context, it is difficult to identify loyalties, much less to pit them against each other. Conflict occurred in areas with high levels of migrants in 1999 but it also erupted in areas with both residential and new migrants. Nevertheless, residential status (new versus old) tended to be a major source of divisiveness. Most of the violence occurred in the new Dili neighborhoods



the United Nations to play a police role in the conflict.

### **Youth and the 2007 Elections**

The Carter Center found that youth played an important and largely positive role in the 2007 parliamentary elections. They were most visible in their roles administering the election and campaigning for political parties. Young people's contributions to the success of the elections contrasts with the image of a violent youth that the 2006 crisis propagates and is a prime example of how this sector can contribute to democratic development in Timor-Leste.

Political parties employed a number of tactics to mobilize young people and stir up greater support for their party. They used youth to create enthusiasm by sending them on convoys to rallies at district centers. Parties attracted less-involved youth by hiring popular rock bands to play at rallies or paying them to plaster the city with posters.

Fretilin and PD worked closely with the former student groups and former clandestine cells to organize campaigns and inform other young people about the elections. In particular, PD drew on the support of former student groups from the Indonesian resistance movement, IMPETTU and RENETIL. Fretilin mobilized former clandestine cells into its youth group, OJETIL.

Carter Center observers noted examples  
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represent the youth”) rather than a specific focus on formulating policies in consultation with the youth. The “youth problem” as defined by many political leaders is seen in the narrow terms of unemployment. Solutions offered are limited to a monetary solution, as in cash-for-work programs, short-term computer training, or English-language instruction.





allowing them to vote. This irregularity posed the greatest potential risk to the integrity of the vote because the voter list was not broken down by polling station. Thus, voters could cast a ballot at any polling station and could confirm their identity with any one of three documents (old or new voter's card or passport). Checking for ink was the only way to ensure that citizens did not vote twice.

In Bobonaro and Lautém, Carter Center observers reported that parties frequently had more than one party agent present in the polling stations. In these districts, observers also saw agents try to enter polling stations with fake accreditation. In both cases, CNE and STAE responded by removing the agents from the station.

Many citizens remained in the vicinity of polling stations to socialize after they finished, and most of these gatherings were celebratory in nature. At some polling stations in Dili, however, groups of political party supporters gathered with the apparent purpose of intimidating voters and/or interfering with the work of the polling-station officials.

The closing of the polls proceeded without major incident. Although most Timorese voted in the morning, it was important for all polling stations to remain open until 4:00 p.m. to ensure that every voter had the opportunity to cast a ballot.

### **Ballot Box Retrieval and Reception**

No major problems were reported by Carter Center observers during the

collection and transport of ballot boxes from the polling centers to the district counting and tabulation centers. Few voters remained at the polling centers when boxes were retrieved, an indication that they understood that the count would take place elsewhere. The ballot boxes were properly sealed and escorted to the tabulation center by UNPol, CNE polling staff, party agents, and observers.

Ballot boxes, however, were not always retrieved quickly due to road conditions, distance between polling stations, and limited number of U.N. vehicles available to transport the boxes. In







the May 9 election. Only a high-risk polling station in the SUCOLisapat (Hatu Lia) reported any problems. Throughout the district, only two incidents were reported and only one incident at a high-risk polling station. Both issues were resolved quickly and peacefully.

### **Presence of International/Domestic Observers**

In total, an estimated 36 groups and 320 international observers monitored voting on election day. A full-day briefing session for international observers was organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). On election day, Carter Center observers coordinated with other international

observers in order to monitor more  
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the agents were aware of how to file a formal complaint.





The results show that support for Fretilin deteriorated. In 2001, the ruling party captured 57 percent of the total vote, but in this election it won more than 50 percent of the vote in only one district. In Dili, 22 percent of voters chose Fretilin, while twice as many—45 percent—voted for CNRT. The percent share of parliamentary seats for Fretilin fell from 62.5 percent to 32 percent. The tarnished reputation of Fretilin's leader, Mari Alkatiri, who was forced to resign as prime minister during the 2006 crisis, may have damaged voter support for his party.

The three leading opposition parties, CNRT, ASDT/PSD, and PD picked up votes from Fretilin, and together they received 51.13 percent of the total vote. PD experienced a 4 percent gain in Parliament seats, and ASDT/PSD gained slightly more than 3 percent. CNRT success may, in part, be attributed to the name recognition offered by Gusmão and Ramos Horta.



CNRT, and ASDT/PSD that they were issuing a “Communiqué for an Alliance to form a parliamentary majority.” Representing more than 52 percent of voters and holding 31 seats, the alliance claimed the right to name the prime minister. Fretilin, the party that won the most votes in the election, argued that the constitution does not allow a postelection coalition to name the prime minister, and, therefore, it was Fretilin that should name the prime minister.

The Timor-Leste constitutional language is admittedly vague in regard to which party or coalition can legitimately lay claim to having a majority in the Parliament and, therefore, elect the prime minister. Article 106 of the Timor-Leste Constitution reads: “The party with the most votes or the party with a majority coalition in Parliament is eligible to elect the prime minister.” Thus, according to the constitution, both the CNRT coalition and Fretilin could reasonably claim the right to elect the prime minister. In order to avoid such an impasse, the article should read, “The party with 50 percent + 1 vote has the right to select the future prime minister. If no one party wins 50 percent + 1 vote in the election, a coalition of parties with votes amounting to 50 percent + 1 is eligible to elect the prime minister.”

The constitution allows the president to intercede in favor of either party’s claim to legitimacy. Although President Ramos Horta called on the parties to work out their differences, he also signaled his preference for the CNRT-led coalition. The potential for conflict was real. Both parties possessed factions

in the armed forces and large youth support networks with longstanding antagonisms against each other. If either party were to cry foul, the other would be unlikely to surrender its claim to rule.

President Ramos Horta gathered Fretilin and the alliance at the end of July and urged them to form a unity government. But the parties still could not agree on who would be the prime minister. President Ramos Horta set a deadline for an agreement, saying he would appoint the prime minister if no deal was reached. In the midst of the dispute, Parliament convened its first session (without a prime minister) on July 30 and elected PD leader Fernando de Araujo Lasama the president of Parliament. The parties did not reach an agreement by President Ramos Horta’s Aug. 6 deadline, so he appointed CNRT leader Xa4(onfB ) on n-6(1)-6.nissesig



## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

The 2007 parliamentary elections were a







distributing election materials in inclement weather. Without the United Nations, ballot boxes would not have arrived at polling stations.

( Helicopters were essential to reaching communities isolated by washed-out bridges and roads.

young people with the skills in order to stay in their districts is advisable rather than adding to the already

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- Printed voter lists should be used at each polling station to safeguard against multiple voting and support the integrity of the vote.
- Vote counting should occur at polling stations immediately following the close of polls.
- International assistance should ensure that more capacity building, technical skills, and resources are provided to enable the Timorese to run future elections without the aid of the United Nations.

### Specific Youth Recommendations

- Make a concerted effort to pass and implement youth-focused legislation. While the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport has developed a new policy toward youth, it has yet to pass Parliament. The National Youth Council, an umbrella organization meant to include former clandestine organizations and youth village representatives, could serve as a vital link between youth and public policy.
- Build rural programs for youth. One of the biggest challenges for any youth program is to create access for all geographic areas. Rural to urban migration remains high, leading to a brain drain in the districts. Providing





## APPENDICES

Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Letter of Invitation

Delegation List

The Carter Center Observer Deployment Plan

May 25, 2007: Timor-Leste Political Party Accord

Observation Forms: Pre-election, d[e]-6(ect)--6(ect)-6(i)-6(o)-4(n)-4(,)-4( )TJ(P)Tj-0.02[e0.002 Tfd(o)-4






## List of Abbreviations

<b>AD-KOTA/PPT</b>	The Democratic Alliance of the Association of Timorese Heroes and Timor People's Party
<b>AODETI</b>	Timorese Popular Democratic Association
<b>ASDT</b>	Association of Timorese ASDT



## Invitation to Observe Elections





## **Delegation List**

**Samantha Aucock**, Timor-Leste Field Office Director, The Carter Center, South Africa

**Angie Bexley**, Anthropologist and Researcher, Australian National University, Australia

**Jeffrey Carter**, Assistant Project Director, Conflict Resolution, The Carter Center,  
United States

**Bradley Decker**, Democracy Program Intern, The Carter Center, United States

**Laura Ertmer**, Timor-Leste Assistant Project Coordinator, The Carter Center, United  
States

**David Hicks**, Professor of Anthropology and Visiting Fellow, State University of New  
York: Stony Brook and University of Cambridge, United States and United  
Kingdom

**Maxine Hicks**, United States and United Kingdom

**Dwight King**, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University Center for  
Southeast Asian Studies, United States

**Dorcha Lee**, Retired Colonel, Irish Defense Forces, Ireland





## Observer Deployment Plan

Carter Center observer teams were deployed to the following district locations over the course of pre-election, polling, counting, and tabulation.

<b>Week One</b>	<b>Week Two</b>	<b>Week Three</b>	<b>Week Four</b>	<b>Election Day and Postelection</b>
Aileu Liquiçá Dili Ermera	Manatuto Baucau Lautém Bobonaro Cova-			





be associated with the campaigns, voting and announcement of results for the parliamentary elections.





Observers:  
District:





- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 25. Did the Ballot Box Officer mark the voter's finger with indelible ink? | Y | N |
| 26. Were there sufficient ballots for the voters?                          |   |   |
| 27. Were some people unable to vote? If so, why?                           | Y | N |
| No proof of identity   |   |   |
| Evidence that he/she already voted   |   |   |



Observers:

District:

Suco:

Polling center:

Polling station:

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Were those that were queued up at 1600h allowed to vote?     | Y | N |
| 2. Were any voters who arrived after 1600h stopped from voting? | Y | N |





Observers:

District:

Time of visit (from/to):

Date:

**Retrieval and Reception**

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 1. Was the retrieval of the ballot boxes completed on June 30th? If not, when? _____   | Y | N |
| 2. Did the reception of the ballot boxes accurately follow procedures?   | Y | N |
| 3. Did the reception team read out the security seals?   | Y | N |
| 4. Have there been any reported incidents of new seal numbers that differ from the numbers on the acta? If yes, specify which party agents reported the incident.  | Y | N |
|  | Y | N |
| 5. Did the President/Chairperson sign the ballot box delivery form and attach it to the acta?  | Y | N |
| 6. Was the information on the acta correct? If not, explain problems/errors:   | Y | N |
|  |   |   |
| 7. Did the total number of used ballots match those listed on the acta?<br>(Ex: Total number of ballots received at opening of the polling station =<br># of used ballots + # of cancelled ballots + # of registered voters) | Y | N |
| 8. If the discrepancy is more than 2%, did the Presiding Officer put the ballot box aside to be sent to CNE in Dilí?   | Y | N |

Mixing

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 9. Did the count staff pile the ballots in bundles of 50s without looking at the ballots?  | Y | N |
| 10. Were the rolls of 50 ballots from different polling stations mixed together before being put into the ballot box labeled, <i>Sidauk Surá</i> | Y | N |
| 11. Were these boxes sealed?   | Y | N |
| 12. Did the reception process go smoothly? If no, specify:   | Y | N |

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**Counting**



32. Did PNTL and UNPOL provide adequate security at the AAD (tabulation center)?		Y	N	
33. Was the count process free of intimidation or incidences? If no, explain:		Y	N	
		Y	N	
34. Was the counting process hindered by any practical problems: insufficient space, material or power? If yes, please identify and explain: _____		Y	N	
35. In your opinion, was the count process transparent? If not, explain why: _____		Y	N	
36. What is your overall assessment of the counting process?				
Good	Minor problems		Major irregulariti Specify:	
37. What is the overall sense of party observers? _____				
38. What is the overal sense of domestic observers? _____				
39. Explain the mood/atmosphere at the end of the count process, e.g. tired, exhausted, frustrated. _____				
Comments (use full sheet if necessary): _____				



## **The Carter Center Deploys Election Observers in Timor-Leste**

**FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**Monday, June 11, 2007**

ATLANTA... The Carter Center launched an international observation mission in Timor-Leste with the deployment of two teams of long-term observers in provinces around the country in early June. A field office in Dili will manage the Center's mission to monitor the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 30, 2007. This will be the first parliamentary election to be administered solely by the Timorese, who voted for independence from Indonesia in 1999.

In March 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste issued an open invitation to interested countries, agencies, and organizations to observe and assist the electoral process. In a visit in April 2007, a Carter Center representative met with political parties, civil society, and domestic observers, all of whom encouraged international observers from the Center to help build confidence in the elections. The Carter Center welcomes this opportunity to assist the Timorese people in peaceful democratic elections and encourages all parties to participate actively and ultimately respect the will of the people.

The Carter Center conducts its activities in a nonpartisan, professional manner in accordance with applicable law and international standards for election monitoring set forth in the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. It will remain in close communication with other international and domestic observer delegations. The Center will publish periodic statements on its findings and recommendations on its Web site, [www.cartercenter.org](http://www.cartercenter.org).





Carter Center involvement in Timor-Leste began in June 1999 when President Jimmy Carter met with Timorese leader Jose Alexandre “Xanana” Gusmao, then under house arrest in Indonesia. The Center subsequently observed the 1999 popular consultation, the 2001 constituent assembly election, and the 2002 presidential election.

The Carter Center was invited by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) to observe the 2007 elections. Center observers visited 12 districts during the parliamentary election campaign and a 15-member delegation observed polling and counting in 8 districts. Observers met with political parties, election officials, civil society, and domestic observers, all of whom encouraged international observers from the Center to help build confidence in the elections.

The Carter Center conducts its election observation in accordance with the Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation and Code of Conduct adopted at the United Nations in 2005. The Center’s interest is in the integrity of the process and not in the outcome of the election. This statement is preliminary and further statements will be issued as necessary to complete our assessment.

### **Election Preparations**

Despite significant logistical challenges, the administration of these elections has been a major success. The Carter Center congratulates CNE and the Technical Secretariat for Election Administration (STAE) for their successful organization of these elections with crucial support from the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste and other international organizations and donors.

### **Campaign**

The campaign period, although largely peaceful, was marked by a number of issues of concern to The Carter Center. Negative campaign practices, such as the use of incendiary political rhetoric, threatened to trigger more violence among political supporters and may have intimidated candidates and citizens from engaging in more vigorous debate. Personalities rather than party policies often predominated. Such practices limit rather than amplify the information available to voters.

Several instances of violence, including two deaths, and other acts of intimidation during the campaign period are deplorable and Timorese political leaders and supporters need to renew their established commitment to political tolerance.

Timor’s diverse linguistic composition and the large youth population compound the challenge facing civic education efforts to strengthen the foundations of democratic behavior in East Timor.



## **Security**

Voter confidence and low incidence of conflict during both the campaign and on election day were partly due to the presence of impartial security officials at polling centers. Although observers did hear reports of Timor-Leste National Police members who were not impartial, such reports were not widespread. The presence of the police, with the assistance of international forces, was a strong deterrent to voter intimidation on election day. Remembering that political division within the security forces was a primary catalyst for the 2006 crisis, the Carter Center strongly encourages the donor community and the Timorese government to focus on the development of a professional and impartial police force.

## **Polling**

The Center congratulates the Timorese people, election workers, security forces, party witnesses, and observers for elections that were peaceful, orderly, and in accordance with the established election procedures.

